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Article 8

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONALIZATION*

GIRARDEAU A. SPANN**

I. INTRODUCTION
Students of constitutional law tend to suspect pretty early on that the
Constitution simply means whatever the Supreme Court says that it means.
Rather than fight that intuition, I think it is best to treat the student insight as
one of the basic starting assumptions when teaching a course in Constitutional
Law. The goal then becomes to help students figure out how best to maneuver
and feel comfortable in a legal universe where the Constitution has only contingent meaning.
The Constitution is best understood as a repository of shifting cultural
values. Normative preferences that the culture holds dear at any particular
point in time are commonly said to emanate from the Constitution, thereby
giving those preferences an aura of fundamental or transcendent importance.
But the view that the Constitution itself prescribes values in a way that is
independent of prevailing cultural norms now seems obsolete. The document
is simply too imprecise, and is typically worded at too high a level of
abstraction, for that view to be taken seriously in a culture that is striving to
survive the insights of legal realism. Rather, the post-realist Constitution
emerges as a metaphor for privileged normative values. And the practice of
constitutional law emerges as the practice of generating constitutional meaning
from normative preferences.
The process of transforming normative preferences into constitutional law
is overseen primarily by the Supreme Court, through the institution of judicial
review. Using its talent for analytical reasoning, the Court amalgamates input
from various sources—including constitutional language, original intent,
political theory, and pragmatic sensitivity—in a way that is intended to give
operational meaning to the abstract principles said to emanate from the
Constitution. In the process of divining constitutional meaning, the Court must
of course consult the culture’s prevailing normative values to ensure that the
* Copyright  2005 by Girardeau A. Spann.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Steven Goldberg,
Lisa Heinzerling, Louis M. Seidman, and Kathryn Zeiler for their help in developing the ideas
expressed in this article.
709

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

710

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:709

Court’s constitutional pronouncements will be politically palatable. But the
Court cannot simply defer to prevailing political preferences, for that would
collapse the important distinction between constitutional law and ordinary
politics on which the enterprise of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism depends for its legitimacy in a democratic society.
The line between permissible constitutional interpretation (that is informed
by prevailing cultural values) and impermissible constitutional pronouncement
(that is simply a conduit for prevailing political preferences) can be a difficult
line to discern. And much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional exposition
can be understood as an effort to explain why the Court’s decisions have not
strayed from the permissible side of the line. But ultimately, the distinction
between constitutional law and ordinary politics becomes untenable. Once
scrutinized, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence appears not only
to consist largely of political policy preferences but also to consist largely of
the political policy preferences that are favored by a majority of the Court.
Although the legitimacy of such judicial review is open to serious question, for
present purposes, it is the process by which political preferences acquire
constitutional stature that is of greater concern.
What the Supreme Court does when it clothes its political policy
preferences in the garb of constitutional law can be described as the process of
constitutionalization. The counter-majoritarian Court takes an action that
would be viewed as having questionable legitimacy if the political or
normative nature of the action were apparent, but the Court legitimates that
action by arguing that the action is actually compelled by the Constitution.
Among the analytical techniques that the Court uses to constitutionalize its
policy preferences, three are of particular interest—as are their vulnerabilities.
First, the Court often adopts tacit analytical baselines to mask the unstated
political assumptions on which its constitutional assertions rest. However, the
technique of baseline shifting can often be used to illuminate those baseline
assumptions in a way that deprives the Court’s arguments of their persuasive
power. Second, the Court often adopts a tacit level of generality in conducting
legal analysis that is designed to increase the intuitive appeal of the Court’s arguments. However, by re-analyzing the Court’s arguments at a different level
of generality, those arguments can often be shown to rest on unsupported political preferences that the Court has adopted. Third, the Court typically
structures its arguments in a syllogistic form designed to show that the Court’s
conclusions follow logically from a set of non-controversial starting assumptions that the Court has made. However, the Court’s arguments can often be
deconstructed to show that the Court’s own starting assumptions lead not to
the conclusion reached by the Court, but rather to the opposite conclusion.
Although the use of these techniques is not limited to the realm of
constitutional law, the meaning of the Constitution is heavily dependent upon
the manner in which these techniques are invoked. Therefore, teaching how
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the process of constitutionalization works is a good way to teach both the
pragmatic and theoretical dimensions of constitutional law.
Part II of this Article discusses the concept of constitutionalization. Part
II(A) discusses the manner in which legal realism supplanted doctrinal
formalism as the prevailing conception of judicial review. Part II(B) discusses
the emergence of constitutionalization as a means of protecting the legitimacy
of judicial review from the insights of legal realism. Part III discusses the
rhetorical techniques that the Supreme Court often uses to constitutionalize
normative preferences and the ways in which those techniques can be
manipulated to expose the political nature of the Court’s decisions. Part III(A)
discusses the technique of baseline shifting. Part III(B) discusses the technique
of manipulating levels of generality. Part III(C) discusses the technique of
deconstruction. Mastering the use of these techniques will not only help us
decode what the Supreme Court is doing when it announces constitutional
rules, but it will also help us to formulate arguments that we ourselves can use
when we ask the Court to constitutionalize our own normative preferences.
The article concludes that once Supreme Court constitutional adjudication
comes to be widely regarded as a mere reflection of Supreme Court political
preferences, society may wish to reconsider the advisability of judicial review.
From the perspective of democratic self-governance, such reconsideration may
well be overdue.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REALISM
Since the advent of legal realism, it has been difficult to argue with a
straight face that the Constitution itself resolves the many contentious political
disputes that are often said to be settled in its name. Proponents and opponents
of controversial practices such as abortion, school prayer, and affirmative
action typically argue that the Constitution requires the outcomes that they
personally prefer. But because that claim can be made with equal amounts of
logical appeal by advocates on both sides of such issues, it seems that the
normative preferences of the advocates—rather than the provisions of the
Constitution—serve as the genesis of the desired results. That is the lesson of
legal realism. And in the wake of legal realism, we are forced to confront the
realization that constitutional meaning is largely the outgrowth of political
preferences possessed by those who have the power to constitutionalize their
normative values.
A.

Legal Realism

In the beginning, the Constitution was thought to contain a set of
determinate legal rules and standards that a reviewing court could consult in a
fairly mechanical manner to ascertain the constitutionality of a challenged
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governmental action.1 Indeed, under the late-nineteenth-century formalist
conception of law as a “science,” legal principles were thought to be
“discovered” and refined through a process of successive adjudications that
tested and retested judicial observations about the content of law in a manner
that resembled the scientific method.2 That formalist view of law was
important to the legitimacy of judicial review because it entailed only a
minimal need for the exercise of judicial discretion, thereby avoiding the
counter-majoritarian problem that would exist if the Supreme Court were seen
to be substituting its policy preferences for the policy preferences of the representative branches of government.3 Luckily, the legal principles embedded in
the Constitution provided the external constraint on judicial discretion that was
needed to ensure the counter-majoritarian legitimacy of judicial review in a
democratic society. And as long as the Supreme Court could credibly claim
that it was “applying” law rather than “making” law, the politically unaccountable Court could avoid the charge that it was violating separation of powers
principles by usurping policy-making authority from the elected branches.4
Legal realism has now made the claim that the Court is simply “applying”
the law contained in the Constitution a hard claim to accept. Beginning as
early as 1910, and proliferating during the 1920s and ‘30s, legal realists
demonstrated that the ambiguities inherent in legal doctrine were so pervasive

1. This view of judicial review is captured by the following frequently quoted statement of
Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler:
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the
people’s representatives. This is a misconception. . . . When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the
judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former.
297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36 (4th ed.
2001). Contemporaneous with the Butler decision, some commentators questioned whether such
nondiscretionary judicial review was realistically possible. See, e.g., Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.,
Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 39 MICH. L. REV. 213, 227–28 (1940).
And it has been suggested that not even Justice Roberts actually contemplated the degree of
nondiscretionary judicial review that is often attributed to him. See David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 531
(1987).
2. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20–37
(1980) (discussing nineteenth-century conception of law as science).
3. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 35–45, 685–92 (discussing counter-majoritarian
problems entailed in judicial review and contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation
designed to constrain judicial discretion).
4. For example, President George W. Bush recently called for a constitutional amendment
banning gay marriage, arguing that such an amendment is necessary to prevent activist judges
from making law rather than merely applying law. See Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Won’t
Review Challenge to Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at A2.
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that courts could not realistically be expected to resolve those ambiguities
without ultimately resting their decisions on the exercise of judicial discretion.
The realists were skeptical about the value of legal rules and principles in
predicting judicial outcomes, and they were distrustful of supposed universal
truths in the context of law.5 This distrust of legal doctrine prompted some
realists to shift their emphasis from law to various social sciences—such as
sociology, psychology, and economics—as a way to ascertain the true basis of
judicial decisions. This spawned the now-ubiquitous “law and” movements
that have paired law with other disciplines.6 Other realists chose to emphasize
the importance of process—as opposed to substantive legal doctrine—in their
efforts to justify the legitimacy of judicial decisions.7
The Critical Legal Studies and Postmodern movements that began in the
1970s and ‘80s took the realist rule skepticism insight to its logical next step.
They applied realist rule skepticism to the claims of legal realism itself and
argued that the indeterminacy highlighted by the realists in the context of legal
doctrine also applied to the social science and process principles that the
realists invoked to fill the void that had been created by their doctrinal indeterminacy insights. According to this Postmodern view, all principles are
sufficiently indeterminate that they require resort to the normative values of the
person applying those principles in order to acquire operational meaning. As a
result, Postmodernists deem all meaning to be contingent rather than universal
and therefore subject to the biases and predispositions of whoever is engaged
in the act of interpretation. Although these more extreme Postmodern claims
remain highly controversial, the rule skepticism and doctrinal indeterminacy
insights of legal realism now seem to be both widely shared and widely
regarded as preferable to the formalist account of law that preceded the advent

5. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 63–75 (discussing growth and nature of legal realism).
Contemporary distrust of principled decision-making is the enduring legacy of the legal realists.
See, e.g., In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) (arguing that
prejudices and preconceptions shared by society, as well as idiosyncratic sympathies of judges,
find expression in society’s legal system); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xiii,
115 (6th ed. 1963) (arguing that judicial temperament, training, biases, and predilections
influence decisions); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
3–4, 11–18, 393 (1960) (arguing that human psychology, particular circumstances, and inherent
probabilities create a nonuniform pattern of decisions); cf. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism,
82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 435–38 (1934) (recognizing that judges often decide cases on policy
grounds and then “wring” from doctrine an acceptable legal basis for the decision).
6. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978) (commenting on
proliferation of “law and” movements in legal scholarship).
7. See BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 3–5 (2004) (discussing American
legal realism and influence of social science and process theories); WHITE, supra note 2, at 63–75
(discussing legal realist attraction to social science and process theories).
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of legal realism.8 In fact, a common contemporary cliché insists that “we are
all realists now.”9
The insights of legal realism have important consequences for
constitutional law. If legal doctrine can no longer be counted on to insulate
judicial decisions from the normative preferences of the judges who render
them, the constitutional law that is being announced by judges will ultimately
be shaped by the normative values of the judges themselves. That, in turn,
threatens the legitimacy of judicial review because the realist indeterminacy
insight means that the Constitution itself can no longer be counted on to impose any interesting degree of constraint on the exercise of judicial discretion.
Stated more bluntly, there is nothing in the post-realist Constitution to prevent
a judge from elevating that judge’s own normative or political preferences to
the level of constitutional law. And to make matters worse, the problem does
not stem merely from the danger of judicial abuse at the hands of judges who
are unable to exercise judicial self-restraint. Rather, the problem stems from
the fact that judicial discretion is a necessary incident of judicial interpretation
because the force of the realist indeterminacy insight is that legal rules and
standards have no operational content until some meaning has been supplied
through recourse to a judge’s normative values.
This does not mean that judges are free to do whatever they like when they
are “interpreting” the Constitution. There are meaningful, pragmatic, and
political constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion. For example, one of
my colleagues once wrote an article arguing that the Constitution required
socialism rather than capitalism as the Nation’s prevailing economic theory.10
Although there are no logical flaws in the argument, everyone realizes that a
contemporary court would never read the Constitution to require socialism.
The economic and ideological forces that influence United States culture
would not tolerate such an outcome. But the constraints that prevent
unacceptable exercises of judicial power are pragmatic and political in nature.
They are not doctrinal constraints. And because they are pragmatic and
political, they cannot be counted on as a safeguard against abuses that are also
pragmatic and political in nature. Pragmatic and political constraints may be
adequate to prevent extreme abuses of judicial discretion, but they cannot be
trusted to guard against the normative preferences of judges in the cases that
8. See BIX, supra note 7, at 4–5, 161–62 (discussing Critical Legal Studies and
Postmodernism). See generally Note, ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670–76 (1982) (discussing
progression from legal realism to Critical Legal Studies).
9. BIX, supra note 7, at 4; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 229
(1986) (“‘We are all realists now.’ The statement has been made so frequently that it has become
a truism to refer to it as a truism.”).
10. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980) (reviewing LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
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are realistically likely to be presented to the courts for constitutional
adjudication. Controversies surrounding issues such as abortion, school
prayer, and affirmative action are contentious precisely because there is no
pragmatic or political consensus on how those issues should be resolved. What
that means, as a matter of constitutional law, is that those issues can be
resolved only through recourse to the normative or political preferences of the
judges who adjudicate them. Once detached from the normative values of the
decision-maker, the Constitution simply does not speak to the controversial
policy issues of the day.
B.

Constitutionalizing Norms

If judicial policy preferences—rather than the Constitution itself—are
ultimately responsible for determining the constitutionality of controversial
social practices such as abortion, school prayer, and affirmative action, the
legitimacy of judicial review is called into serious question. If all that judges
are doing when they rule on the constitutionality of the day’s burning social
issues is substituting their own policy preferences for the policy preferences of
the representative branches of government, the institution of judicial review
becomes difficult to square with the idea of democratic self-governance.
Under our tripartite constitutional scheme of divided governmental powers, the
politically accountable representative branches are given the power to
formulate social policy. The politically unaccountable, “least dangerous” judicial branch11 is given the power to nullify those policy choices only when they
violate norms that are contained in the Constitution—not when they merely
offend judicial ideas of policy prudence.12 As a result, legal realism has forced
the proponents of judicial review to propose justifications for the practice of
judicial review that are designed to deflect the realist threat. Theories ranging
from hard originalism, to natural law deontology, to process-based
representation reinforcement have been proposed. To date, however, no postrealist theory of judicial review has been able to overcome the power of the
realist indeterminacy critique, and no theory has been able to command
consensus support.13 Nevertheless, you may have noticed that the institution of

11. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
16–23 (1962) (noting the view of Alexander Hamilton that the judiciary
is less threatening to political rights than other branches of federal government and discussing the
limited competence of the Supreme Court to make social policy).
12. See id. (discussing counter-majoritarian problem entailed in judicial review); STONE ET
AL., supra note 1, at 35–45 (also discussing counter-majoritarian problem entailed in judicial
review).
13. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 685–92 (discussing contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation designed to constrain judicial discretion in way that avoids countermajoritarian problem).
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
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judicial review is still alive and well in the United States, notwithstanding the
lack of a satisfactory solution to the post-realist counter-majoritarian problem.
The Supreme Court remains ultimately responsible for announcing
constitutional rules in the United States, even though the contemporary Court
is widely regarded as a political body. The Court consists of a recognized
liberal voting bloc and a recognized conservative voting bloc.
The
conservative bloc presently comprises a political majority on the Court, and it
typically prevails by 5–4 votes in cases involving controversial social issues.
Close cases tend to be decided by the politically more moderate “swing”
Justices on the Court.14 Supreme Court nominees, as well as controversial
lower court nominees, are subject to having their appointments blocked in the
Senate through filibusters—solely because of partisan opposition to their
political views.15 And recently, partisan support for conservative nominees has
even generated proposals to modify the long-standing Senate filibuster rules
themselves, in order to prevent liberals in the Senate minority from blocking
the appointment of conservative nominees who are viewed as having extreme
political views.16 Political litmus tests are also commonly used to determine
the judicial “qualifications” of potential nominees, and those litmus tests are
used with equal vigor by members of both major political parties.17
There can be little doubt that the judicial process is intensely political.18
Politics determines judicial selection because those who select the judges
suppose that politics will frequently determine how the selected judges will
vote. And there can be little doubt that this supposition is correct. When the
Supreme Court definitively “interprets” the Constitution, as the Court insists
that it has the power to do,19 the Justices have little choice but to constitutionalize their own normative values because the Constitution itself is too
abstract to provide concrete case outcomes. The provisions of the Constitution, therefore, end up meaning whatever the political preferences of a
Supreme Court majority cause them to mean at any given point in time. The

14. See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159–64 (2000) (discussing
Supreme Court voting blocs on affirmative action issues).
15. See Helen Dewar, Judiciary Panel Backs Specter: GOP Senators Elicit Pledge Not to
Block Antiabortion Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2004, at A6; Michael A. Fletcher & Helen
Dewar, Bush Will Renominate 20 Judges: Fights in Senate Likely Over Blocked Choices, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at A1.
16. See Dewar, supra note 15; Fletcher & Dewar, supra note 15.
17. See Dewar, supra note 15.
18. See id.; Fletcher & Dewar, supra note 15.
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–20 (1958) (recognizing “the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,” and quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for the proposition that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”).
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First Amendment now protects subversive advocacy,20 even though it used to
prohibit criticism of governmental policies.21 The Equal Protection Clause
now prohibits racial segregation22 and discrimination against women,23 even
though the Constitution used to permit both.24 The Due Process Clause now
protects the right to abortion,25 even though that right did not exist before
1973,26 and even though it might cease to exist after the next Supreme Court
appointment.27 Throughout all of those changes in constitutional meaning,
however, the language and original intent of the pertinent constitutional
provisions has remained precisely the same. The only thing that has changed
is the normative values of the Justices—informed by their own political
preferences and by their perceptions of the political leanings of the culture at
large.
Notwithstanding the obvious influence of judicial policy preferences on
constitutional adjudication, the political character of judicial review has not
produced the crisis in judicial legitimacy that one might have expected to
follow the realist assault on the fig leaf of principled judicial neutrality. Even
after the Supreme Court arguably delegated to itself the power to choose the
next President of the United States in its 2000 Bush v. Gore decision,28 the
Court was able to escape largely unscathed from the vocal charges of politically motivated decision making that ensued.29 One cannot help but wonder

20. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects subversive speech at Ku Klux Klan rally).
21. E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that the First Amendment
does not protect distribution of fliers claiming that military conscription violates the Thirteenth
Amendment).
22. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregated education).
23. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit women to be excluded from unique
Virginia military college).
24. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Constitution permits
Louisiana law requiring racial segregation of railroad passengers); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that the Constitution permits Illinois law denying women license
to practice law).
25. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects
right to abortion).
26. See id.
27. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537–38, 556, 560 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that new Supreme Court
appointment could result in overruling right to abortion).
28. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a Florida Supreme Court
order to recount votes in the extremely close 2000 presidential election, thereby enabling George
W. Bush to become President of the United States).
29. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1450–58 (noting there was only modest decline in popular support for the Court
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why a society that is formally committed to the principle of democratic selfgovernance would nevertheless permit the most controversial of its social
policies to be determined by a politically unaccountable Supreme Court. The
answer seems to be that United States culture is also committed to a principle
of liberal individual rights, whose protection from the whims of self-interested
majorities is guaranteed by the Constitution. And constitutional protection of
liberal rights cannot work unless a counter-majoritarian body such as the
Supreme Court can be trusted to enforce those rights against potentially
oppressive political majorities.
The realists have now demonstrated that the Supreme Court cannot reliably
be trusted to perform this function in a non-political way—that the Supreme
Court itself might be the fox that is guarding the henhouse gates.30 But that is
an insight that society cannot acknowledge without risking a breakdown in the
liberal conception of individual rights itself.31 It appears that United States
culture likes the idea of judicial review so much that it is often willing simply
to overlook the counter-majoritarian problem created by the influence of
judicial politics on constitutional adjudication. Rather than confront the
separation of powers difficulties inherent in post-realist judicial review, the
culture is inclined to accept any plausible invitation to look the other way when
the Court permits its politics to influence its constitutional decisions.
Professor Mark Tushnet once noted that Senate confirmation hearings for
federal judicial nominees ritualistically require nominees to assure the
Judiciary Committee that they will follow the intent of the framers and “apply”
the law of the Constitution, rather than allow their own political views to
“make” constitutional law. That ritual is repeated in successive judicial
nomination hearings, even though both the nominees and the Senators who
question them ought to understand the hollowness of such assurances.32 However, the persistence of those recurrent confirmation ceremonies suggests that
the rituals associated with judicial neutrality may be more important than the
reality of judicial politics. Performance rituals of this sort seek to reassure us
about the legitimacy of judicial review, in the apparent belief that judicial

in the wake of Bush v. Gore and suggesting ways in which the Supreme Court may end up
retaining or increasing its political capital in the aftermath of the decision).
30. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (upholding institution of
slavery); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women’s right
to vote); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion order that led to
World War II internment of Japanese-American citizens); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (upholding criminalization of homosexual conduct).
31. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781–86 (1983) (arguing that neutral constitutional
principles needed for judicial enforcement of liberal constitutional rights can come only from a
conservative communitarian tradition that denies the importance of liberal individual rights).
32. See id.
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neutrality can be achieved through an act of will. They do this both by
distracting us from the fact that it is the normative values of judges that
generate the content of constitutional law and by focusing our attention on the
alternate ideal of judicial neutrality. The rituals are not analytically responsive
to the counter-majoritarian problem. But they appear to work because we want
them to work. It is as if by reciting the words of a mantra frequently enough,
we can make the aspirations of the mantra become true.
Law obviously serves an important legitimating function in the United
States. In the past, we have relied on the legal system to justify practices such
as slavery,33 the seizure of land from indigenous Indians,34 the wartime
internment of Japanese-American citizens,35 and the refusal to allow women to
vote.36 Now we rely on law to justify practices such as de facto racial
discrimination,37 capital punishment,38 flag burning,39 nude dancing,40 and online pornography.41 Whether such practices are Platonically “correct” could be
endlessly debated, but we have generally accepted those practices as culturally
appropriate when the Supreme Court has told us that they were constitutionally
protected. As long as the Court honors the rituals associated with judicial
review, we tend to view as legitimate the practices that the Court has chosen to
authorize.

33. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating congressional statute prohibiting
slavery in Louisiana Territory).
34. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that European discovery of
land now constituting the United States, and conquest of indigenous Indian inhabitants, divested
Indians of title to that land).
35. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclusion order
leading to internment of Japanese-American citizens).
36. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women’s right
to vote).
37. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (adopting
expansive interpretation of de jure segregation but reaffirming prohibition on use of raceconscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (same); cf., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976)
(reading Equal Protection Clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by
intentional discrimination).
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of capital
punishment).
39. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating under First Amendment a Texas
statute prohibiting flag desecration).
40. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (finding First Amendment protection
for nude dancing but upholding requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings).
41. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds
federal Child Online Protection Act, which criminalized commercial posting on World Wide Web
of pornographic material that would be harmful to minors).
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The ritual associated with judicial review that is of primary importance is
the ritual of reasoned deliberation.42 As long as the Supreme Court can
announce its constitutional rulings in ways that appear to flow from the
application of neutral principles to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution,
the Court’s rulings are likely to be generally accepted as legitimate.43 To do
this, the Court’s opinions must, inter alia, demonstrate appropriate deference
to precedent, to the text of the Constitution, to the intent of the framers, and to
the rigors of syllogistic analysis. Those opinions, of course, must also exude
the presence of judicial neutrality.44 It is the form of reasoned deliberation that
appears to legitimate the substance of the Court’s constitutional rulings. This
is true, even though the realists have taught us that judicial neutrality is likely
to be only a matter of form.
I am not suggesting that Supreme Court Justices are engaged in a
conspiracy that is designed to trick the American electorate into ceding policymaking power to the unelected judiciary. On the contrary, I am suggesting that
the Supreme Court is simply doing precisely what we ask the Court to do. It
is, of course, possible to view the Supreme Court as an agent of those who
possess social power, whose judicial function is to manipulate those who lack
social power into submitting to the demands of the existing power structure.45
It is also possible to view the Court as a more sophisticated actor, whose true
function is to convince us all that the existing distributional system operates
fairly, so that those of us who lack power will continue to work within the
existing system rather than trying to replace the system with more
revolutionary alternatives.46 However appealing such accounts might at times
appear to be, I am suggesting that something more subtle is going on.
Professor Mark Kelman has argued that the process of successfully
legitimating social practices and norms is more likely to be cognitive than
conspiratorial in nature.47 The process is a largely passive one that relies more
42. See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 188 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court possesses
“resources of rhetoric” to convince political branches and the public of the importance of
principles that the Court espouses).
43. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 16–20 (1959) (emphasizing the importance to judicial review of constitutional
adjudication based on neutral principles that are disinterested, detached from political
determinants, and that transcend the result in the case at issue).
44. See id. at 17.
45. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262–63 (1987) (describing
the process of legitimation); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 153 (1993) (also describing the process
of legitimation).
46. See KELMAN, supra note 45, at 262–63 (describing legitimation as a process of depicting
resource distribution system as fair); see also SPANN, supra note 45, at 153 (also describing
legitimation as a process of depicting resource distribution system as fair).
47. KELMAN, supra note 45, at 269–95.
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on inertia than on guile.48 The practices and norms that are legitimated could
easily be questioned if we ever thought to scrutinize them. But it never occurs
to us to subject them to analysis, because we simply accept them as foundational assumptions. Moreover, the culture’s repeated reliance on such tacit
assumptions further reinforces those assumptions, so that over time they grow
stronger and therefore even more immune from subsequent scrutiny. This
process of legitimation cannot fairly be termed conspiratorial because the
legitimated assumptions actually have as much influence over those who gain
power from their operation as over those to whom power is denied.49 The
process works because it ends up defining the cognitive categories in which all
of us grow accustomed to thinking.50 And, of course, the process works best
when its operation is undetected.
Accordingly, the reason that the institution of judicial review has been able
to survive the realist indeterminacy insight—an insight that should have caused
judicial review to suffer a crisis of democratic legitimacy—is that the
normative values and political preferences of judges that are needed to provide
constitutional meaning are constitutionalized in a manner that is largely hidden
from view. Because we want the process of judicial review to remain viable
enough to prevent the collapse of our system of liberal constitutional rights, we
have an interest in avoiding a confrontation with any theory that would
threaten the coherence of that system of rights. We are, therefore, a receptive
audience that is eager to embrace judicial opinions whose form suggests that
they emanate from constitutional principles. And the institution of judicial review should continue to work well, as long as we do not analyze those judicial
opinions too closely.
III. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES
Abstractly, the normative values contained in our organic Constitution are
the values of the culture at large, as those values shift and develop at various
points along the path of our cultural evolution. Operationally, however, the
meaning of the post-realist Constitution is determined by the normative values
and political preferences of the Supreme Court Justices who interpret the
Constitution. The adjudicatory process by which judicial norms are given
constitutional stature depends for its legitimacy more on the form of the
constitutional arguments that the Court offers to justify its rulings than on the
substance of those arguments. For those arguments to be convincing, it must
appear that the Court’s constitutional conclusions flow logically from the

48. SPANN, supra note 45, at 153.
49. KELMAN, supra note 45, at 262.
50. See KELMAN, supra note 45, at 269–95 (describing legitimation as a process of defining
categories of social thought); SPANN, supra note 45, at 153 (also describing legitimation as a
process of defining categories of social thought).
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provisions of the Constitution itself. Consciously or unconsciously, the
Supreme Court often hides its own normative values and political preferences
in the interstices of its opinions, where they are not readily apparent or easily
evaluated. However, three analytical techniques are useful in uncovering the
presence of such judicial preferences and in exposing the manner in which
those preferences influence the Court’s decisions. They are the techniques of
baseline shifting, manipulating levels of generality, and deconstruction. I
believe that teaching students to master these techniques is a good way to teach
Constitutional Law.
Once students learn to use these techniques effectively, they will be able to
identify for themselves the analytical weak spots in the Court’s opinions and
the role that judicial politics has played in generating the Court’s decisions. In
addition, they will be able to use these techniques to manipulate doctrine for
themselves and make the Constitution generate the outcomes that they deem
desirable—which is the essence of practicing constitutional law. But most
importantly, once students learn to manipulate doctrine for themselves, they
will no longer be able to doubt the legal realist critique of supposedly
principled judicial decision making. This will force students to confront
directly the troublesome questions that are raised about the legitimacy of
judicial review in a post-realist legal culture. Perhaps there are still reasons
why we should favor constitutionalization of the normative values and political
preferences possessed by our judges. But if such reasons exist, students will
have to formulate them in order to justify to themselves the continued
desirability of counter-majoritarian judicial review.
A.

Baseline Shifting

One way to expose the judicial preferences lying beneath the surface of a
court’s opinion is to focus on the baseline assumptions that the court makes in
reaching its decision.51 A good way to understand the concept of baseline
shifting is to view a baseline as the thing that separates the propositions that an
argument explicitly addresses from the propositions that the argument simply
assumes without discussion. The propositions that receive explicit attention
are located above the analytical baseline. The propositions whose validity is
tacitly assumed lie beneath the baseline.

51. Portions of the baseline-shifting discussion included in this subsection are taken from
text that I originally wrote for multimedia Contracts teaching materials prepared with Professors
John Weistart and H. Jefferson Powell at the Duke University School of Law in 2001. Although
those materials have not been published in any traditional form, they are contained on a
multimedia DVD that the three authors and others have used to teach their first-year Contracts
courses. See Videotape: The Contracts Experience (Duke University School of Law 2003) (on
file with the author).
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Legal arguments made in support of particular propositions—including the
arguments made in judicial opinions—always address issues that are above the
analytical baseline. But their persuasive power often rests on tacit assumptions
that lie beneath the baseline. If the tacit assumptions that drive a legal
argument can be exposed and scrutinized, the argument may lose some of its
persuasive force. The tacit assumptions on which a legal argument rests can
often be exposed by shifting the analytical baseline so that the tacit
assumptions can then be more readily scrutinized. In other words, baseline
shifting enables us to evaluate the legitimacy of baseline assumptions that we
might otherwise simply take for granted.
It is easiest to understand the concept of baseline shifting by using a
concrete example. Here is a simple one. In the 1872 case of Bradwell v.
Illinois,52 the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court that denied a married woman the right to practice law. The Illinois Supreme Court justified its decision in part by noting that one of the
things that lawyers had to be able to do was enter into enforceable contracts
with their clients.53 Because Illinois law did not permit married women to
make legally binding contracts in their own names, it followed that married
women could not be permitted to practice law.54 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed that decision on the grounds that the Illinois Supreme Court’s
gender-based denial of the right to practice law did not violate the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United Stated Constitution.55
The portion of the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion denying Ms. Bradwell
a license to practice law on contract incapacity grounds was explicit.56 It
existed above the analytical baseline. However, the argument rested on a tacit
assumption that the Illinois law prohibiting women from making contracts was
itself defensible. Although the Court’s conclusion was utterly dependent upon
the legitimacy of that assumption, the Court’s opinion never even addressed
the issue. Rather, the contractual incapacity assumption performed its
dispositive function from its hiding place beneath the analytical baseline.57
By shifting the baseline down—so that the assumed inability of women to
make contracts rises above the baseline, where its legitimacy can be
scrutinized—the Court’s argument loses any persuasive power that it might
have had back in 1873. The assumption that married women lacked the
capacity to make their own contracts was rooted in the belief that the property

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (Ill. 1869).
Id.
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139.
In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. at 535 (discussing the effect of contractual incapacity).
Id. at 539–40 (never attempting to justify contractual incapacity of married women).
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and business affairs of married women were best handled by their husbands.58
Today, that view seems silly. But it seems silly only because we have now
taken the trouble to scrutinize it. In 1873, when the dependence of married
women on the superior judgment of their husbands was simply assumed
without scrutiny, the assumption was able to drive the argument that women
were not fit to practice law. And it was able to do so from beneath the
baseline, where its influence was largely undetected.
Sometimes it is fairly obvious that a legal argument rests on a tacit
assumption whose validity has not been established. In such circumstances,
the baseline shifting needed to expose and evaluate the tacit assumption may
occur easily and automatically. Few people in the twenty-first century would
be tricked into believing that women could not practice law through blind
acceptance of a nineteenth-century baseline assumption that women lack the
capacity to contract. However, sometimes legal arguments rest on tacit assumptions that are too subtle for most of us to recognize at first glance. In
such cases, considerable conscious effort may be required to shift the
analytical baseline down far enough to expose those assumptions. Indeed,
creative forms of legal argument that challenge traditional ways of thinking are
often necessary to expose some of our most influential cultural assumptions.
That is because those assumptions are so firmly rooted that we never think to
question them. Here is an example:
In its famous 1905 Lochner v. New York decision,59 the United States
Supreme Court gave the doctrine of freedom of contract constitutional status.
The Court invalidated a New York statute regulating the maximum number of
hours that bakers could work in any one week or in any one day.60 The law
had been passed as a health and safety measure, designed to reduce some of the
dangers that the New York legislature found to be posed by the excessive
hours that bakers were being forced to work by their employers.61 The
Supreme Court held, however, that the statute violated the United States
Constitution because the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of employers and employees
to make whatever employment contracts they desired without state interference
in the form of maximum hours regulation.62
The decision was controversial at the time it was issued, but it has now
been largely repudiated, both by commentators and by the Supreme Court

58. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139–42 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be,
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”).
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id. at 57–63.
62. Id. at 64.
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itself.63 For present purposes, however, what is important is identifying the
tacit baseline assumption on which that historic decision rested. The Supreme
Court held that freedom of contract was protected by the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution.64 The Court further equated freedom of contract with the economic theory of laissez-faire capitalism—the belief that
markets should not be distorted by government intervention.65 The bulk of the
majority opinion in Lochner was directed to the question of whether the
occupation of being a baker was sufficiently hazardous to justify the need for
regulation by the New York statute as a health and safety measure.66 Because
the Supreme Court majority believed that the statute could not be so justified,
it viewed the statute as a form of economic regulation, rather than as a form of
health and safety regulation.67 And as economic regulation, the statute
impermissibly violated the doctrine of laissez-faire freedom of contract.68
Stated more succinctly, the majority thought that the New York legislature
was siding with the bakers rather than the employers in the labor contract
negotiations that occurred between the two concerning hours of employment.69
For the Supreme Court majority, this violated freedom of contract because the
capitalist market rather than the state should determine the terms of a
contract.70 By siding with the bakers in their negotiations with their
employers, the state provided a subsidy to the bakers in the form of increased
bargaining power.71 In economic terms, this subsidy distorted natural market
ordering because it gave bakers artificial bargaining power that they would not
possess in the absence of the market-distorting statute.72 This is commonly
understood to be the import of the majority opinion in Lochner,73 and the
Court’s argument was presented above the analytical baseline in a way that
was very visible.74
However, the Court’s opinion diverted analytical attention to the issue of
what did and did not constitute a permissible piece of health and safety
63. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 718–29 (discussing the widespread condemnation and
ultimate demise of the Lochner decision).
64. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
65. See id. at 53–54.
66. See id. at 57–63 (discussing the public health and safety justifications behind the
enactment of the statute).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 64 (holding that the statute violated the constitutionally protected right to
freedom of contract).
69. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63.
70. STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 723.
71. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 718–23 (discussing the freedom of contract
implications of Lochner).
74. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
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legislation.75 In so doing, the Supreme Court majority was able to take
advantage of a tacit assumption lying beneath the baseline that gave the
majority’s argument whatever persuasive power it possessed. The majority
tacitly assumed that the economic market in existence before New York
enacted its statutory subsidy to bakers was a natural market. However, once
the analytical baseline is shifted down to expose the unstated assumption that
the pre-Lochner market was a natural market, the assumption can be subjected
to analytical scrutiny. After such scrutiny, the tacit assumption becomes
highly questionable.
Even prior to the enactment of the Lochner statute, the economic market
was riddled with government subsidies.76 For example, government right-ofway land grants subsidized railroads by permitting them to deflect some of
their business costs to the taxpayers.77 In addition, the government provided
employers with more general subsidies, such as police and fire department services, which enabled employers to avoid the costs that they would otherwise
need to incur in order to secure their own private police and fire protection.
Even more subtly, the very existence of contract law is itself a “marketdistorting” subsidy. In the absence of state-provided contract law and stateprovided courts to enforce contracts, contracting parties would have to incur
the expense of self-help measures to secure the enforcement of their
agreements.
All of these subsidies made the market that pre-existed the Lochner statute
a market that was far from a natural market. Accordingly, once the baseline is
shifted down to permit examination of the assumption on which Lochner
rested—that the pre-Lochner market was a natural market—the Lochner
opinion ends up simply favoring one form of market subsidization over
another. The Lochner opinion makes it clear that a majority of the Court had
normative values and political preferences that favored employer-oriented
business subsidies over labor-oriented redistributive subsidies. But although
the Court’s policy preferences determined the outcome of the case, those
judicial preferences were never addressed, analyzed, or defended in the
Lochner opinion.
Shifting the analytical baseline also suggests that the natural market ideal
of Lochner is merely a metaphysical abstraction that cannot exist in real life.
Regardless of how one feels about the various competing market subsidies that
are at issue in Lochner, the decision looks very different once the tacit baseline
75. See id. at 57–63.
76. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 723 (noting that Lochner adopted a “bad”
baseline by assuming that the pre-Lochner market was free of redistributive subsidies).
77. See generally Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Railsto-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to
the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 365–89 (2000) (discussing the history of
government land grant subsidies to railroads).
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assumption has been exposed and scrutinized than it did when the natural market assumption remained hidden beneath the baseline. The Lochner illustration
also demonstrates that creative lawyering can often reveal baseline assumptions that might otherwise be easily overlooked. It further suggests that
we may often be able to uncover some unexamined baseline assumptions lying
beneath our commonly held beliefs, if only we have the time, skill, and incentive to uncover them.78
Baseline shifting can also be used to illuminate the undefended judicial
policy preferences that lie beneath the Supreme Court’s resolution of
controversies surrounding more contemporary issues of social policy. The
issue of abortion is obviously quite controversial in current United States
culture. The way that one feels about the issue is likely to be determined in
large part by the baseline assumption that one makes about whether human life
begins at conception or at birth.79 Similarly, the way that one balances the
competing interests between the fetus and the mother that are raised by the
issue of abortion is likely to be determined by the same baseline assumption.80
The baseline assumption that one makes about when life begins is so salient
that it is unlikely to go unnoticed or unscrutinized in a judicial analysis of the
right to abortion. However, the way that one feels about some of the collateral
issues implicated in the abortion debate are likely to be determined by the tacit
baseline assumptions that one makes.
A collateral issue that has generated continuing controversy is the issue of
whether the Constitution requires a right to abortion funding by the
government. In Maher v. Roe81 and Harris v. McRae,82 the Supreme Court
held that the constitutional right to abortion that was recognized in Roe v.
78. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has made the following observation about Lochner:
When the Court rejected Lochner, it did so largely on the ground that the common law
baseline from which the Court had been operating could no longer be justified. The Court
recognized that respect for the common law baseline and for the existing distribution of
wealth and entitlements could itself be governmental “action” or the product of faction;
the common law was itself a creation of the legal system. The lesson of the demise of
Lochner was that common law or status quo baselines should no longer be used
reflexively in public law.
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 501–02 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–62 (discussing whether a fetus is a “person” within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. See id. at 163–66 (using trimester structure to balance competing interests); cf. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (joint opinion of O’Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (adopting the “undue burden” balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of restrictions on right to abortion).
81. 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (upholding state regulation granting Medicaid benefits for
childbirth but denying benefits for non-therapeutic abortions).
82. 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding federal “Hyde Amendment” denying funding
for even therapeutic abortions where life of mother was not threatened).
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Wade83 does not compel the government to fund abortions for indigent women,
even when the government chooses to fund medical services that are associated
with childbirth. However, the Court’s decisions denying a constitutional right
to abortion-funding rest on an unstated baseline assumption whose validity can
be called into question by shifting the analytical baseline.
Because Roe v. Wade recognized a constitutional right to abortion,84 the
government is precluded from penalizing the exercise of that right. Indeed,
Roe itself invalidated a state statute that imposed criminal penalties on the act
of procuring an abortion.85 However, Maher and Harris held that the
government refusals to fund abortions in those cases did not penalize the
exercise of the right to abortion; they merely entailed a governmental decision
not to subsidize the exercise of that right.86 The inability of the plaintiffs in
those cases to pay for the abortions that they sought resulted from their own
indigence, not from the government’s refusal to subsidize their desires.87
Framed in this manner, the Court’s argument sounds both plausible and
persuasive. If the right to travel does not require the government to pay a
traveler’s bus fare, the right to abortion should not require the government to
fund a woman’s abortion.88 But by shifting the analytical baseline, the Court’s
reasoning can be shown merely to rest on an unstated normative preference for
childbirth over abortion.
The argument advanced by the Court in Maher and Harris tacitly assumed
that the government was doing nothing more than declining to subsidize
abortions and that it was doing so in a neutral manner that was not intended to
penalize the right to abortion. But by shifting the analytical baseline to an
earlier point in time, that tacit assumption loses its persuasive force. Prior to
adopting the abortion-funding measures at issue in Maher and Harris, the government already had in place benefits programs that were designed to pay for
the medical services associated with pregnancy. However, as the abortion
issue became increasingly controversial, the government chose to exempt
coverage for abortion services from those programs.89 Once the baseline is
shifted to emphasize this fact, the government decisions not to fund abortions
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–66.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
87. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74 (government was merely refusing to fund the right to
abortion); Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–178 (holding that the constitutional right to abortion does not
mean that a woman is entitled to the financial means to fund an abortion).
88. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 (using a bus fare analogy).
89. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 300–04 (discussing the recurring “Hyde Amendment”
prohibition, first adopted in 1976, that restricts the use of federal funds for abortions under the
Social Security Medicaid program adopted in 1965); Maher, 432 U.S. at 466 (discussing similar
regulation adopted by the Connecticut Department of Welfare in 1975, restricting use of state
funds for abortions).
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no longer look like neutral revenue-saving measures. Rather, they look like
discriminatory governmental actions that are intended to discourage the
exercise of the right to abortion. Stated differently, the government’s actions
no longer look like mere refusals to subsidize but rather like the imposition of
a penalty on the right to abortion. In amending the previous pregnancy
benefits programs that were in place, the government decided that it would
fund the termination of pregnancies when those pregnancies were terminated
by childbirth but not when those pregnancies were terminated by abortion. It
is not a woman’s indigence that results in the denial of funding to terminate her
pregnancy—indigent women can get government funding to terminate their
pregnancies through childbirth.90 Rather, it is the government’s anti-abortion
policy that results in the denial of the right to abortion. So viewed, the government’s actions have both the intent and effect of penalizing the right to
abortion. Once again, it is possible that there are analytically defensible
reasons for permitting the government to refrain from funding abortions, but
those reasons are never addressed or defended in the Supreme Court’s
abortion-funding opinions. The Court’s decisions again rest on the normative
values and political preferences of a majority of the Justices.
Skillfully used, the technique of baseline shifting can enable one to isolate
the point in a court’s analytical reasoning where the policy preferences of the
judge are hidden. By uncovering those vulnerable points in the court’s
analysis, any unwarranted persuasive momentum created by a judicial opinion
can be dissipated and a sounder analysis can be offered in its place. But if the
realists are correct, the “sounder” analysis can ultimately be shown to rest
simply on an alternate set of normative preferences as well.
B.

Levels of Generality

A second technique that can be useful in uncovering normative preferences
of judges that are hidden in judicial opinions is the technique of manipulating
levels of generality. Legal arguments often assume a tacit level of generality
in the analyses that they offer to justify their conclusions. However, an
argument that initially seems persuasive when evaluated at one level of
generality may lose its persuasive power when evaluated at a different level of
generality. Therefore, shifting levels of generality is a good way to expose the
vulnerable points in a court’s constitutional arguments. Manipulating levels of
generality can also be helpful in formulating constitutional arguments that
advocates wish to have courts adopt.
A simple illustration of the way in which an argument’s tacit level of
generality can affect its persuasiveness is provided by the non-constitutional
tort case of Salinetro v. Nystrom.91 The plaintiff was injured in an automobile
90. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
91. 341 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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accident when she was four to six weeks pregnant.92 While treating the
plaintiff for back injuries sustained in the accident, the defendant doctor took
an X-ray of the plaintiff’s pelvis, which appears to have caused the death of the
plaintiff’s fetus.93 The plaintiff then sued the defendant doctor for malpractice,
alleging that he had been negligent in exposing the plaintiff to an X-ray
without first asking her whether she was pregnant.94 However, the court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant doctor because the plaintiff had
not established that the doctor’s alleged negligence caused the injury to the
plaintiff’s fetus.95 The plaintiff’s own testimony revealed that the plaintiff
herself was not yet aware of her pregnancy; therefore, the plaintiff would not
have been able to inform the defendant of her pregnancy even if the defendant
had asked the plaintiff whether she was pregnant.96 As a result the court
concluded that there was no causal connection between the defendant doctor’s
alleged negligence and any injury to the plaintiff’s fetus.97
The court’s analysis seems persuasive when evaluated at the level of
generality tacitly utilized in the court’s opinion. However, if analyzed at a
different level of generality, the court’s decision becomes much less
defensible. The court’s analysis occurred at a relatively low level of
generality, focusing on the question of whether the doctor had been negligent
in failing to ask the plaintiff whether she was pregnant.98 At that level of
generality, the court’s conclusion about the lack of causation seems correct.
But if the analysis is conducted at a higher level of generality it is relatively
easy to conclude that the doctor was negligent and that the doctor’s negligence
was the cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s fetus.
If one views the negligence of the doctor as consisting of the failure to
ascertain whether the plaintiff was pregnant—as opposed to merely failing to
ask whether the plaintiff was pregnant—the plaintiff’s case looks much
stronger. Women with irregular menstrual cycles are often unaware that they
are pregnant during the first four to six weeks of their pregnancies, and
attentive doctors know that this is often the case. Therefore, it may well be
negligent for a doctor to rely solely on a woman’s negative answer to a question about her pregnancy, without asking follow-up questions about the date of

92. Id. at 1060.
93. Id. The actual cause of death is uncertain because the plaintiff followed her gynecologist’s advice and underwent a therapeutic abortion. However, a pathology report indicates
that the fetus was dead at the time of the abortion. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1061.
96. Salinetro, 341 So. 2d at 1061.
97. Id.
98. Id. (“Assuming arguendo that Dr. Nystrom’s conduct fell below the standard of care in
failing to inquire of Anna whether she was pregnant or not on the date of her last menstrual
period, the omission was not the cause of her injury.”).
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the woman’s last menstrual cycle, or without administering a quick and
inexpensive over-the-counter pregnancy test. Analyzed at this higher level of
generality, the Salinetro court may well have been wrong to direct a verdict for
the defendant. The level of generality at which a court’s analysis is conducted
can often end up being outcome determinative.
Although Salinetro was a non-constitutional tort case, the level-ofgenerality problem recurs frequently in constitutional cases. A large portion of
contemporary constitutional law entails the balancing of competing interests.99
And interest-balancing is heavily dependent on the level of generality at which
the competing interests are balanced. Consider the constitutional case of New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.100 In Beazer, the plaintiffs filed a class
action challenging a New York Transit Authority rule that denied employment
to individuals who were narcotic drug users, including the plaintiffs, who were
using the synthetic narcotic methadone as part of a drug treatment program for
heroin addiction.101 The District Court made factual findings that people who
had successfully remained in a methadone maintenance program for at least
one year were as employable as other members of the public for low-risk
Transit Authority jobs.102 As a group, they did not differ from other applicants
in terms of their reliability, capability, safety, or efficiency.103 Accordingly,
the District Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the Transit
Authority from using its overbroad narcotic rule to discriminate against
employable applicants simply because they used methadone as part of a drug
treatment program, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.104
The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion by Justice Stevens,
holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit the Transit Authority
from discriminating against employable applicants on the basis of their
methadone use.105 The Court conceded that exclusion by the Transit Authority
of all methadone users from employment might be overbroad and even
imprudent.106 But the Court noted that the one-year rule adopted by the
District Court would also be both overbroad and underinclusive.107 The nature
of general rules is that they have an imprecise fit with their intended
objectives. The only way to avoid such an imperfect fit was to abandon a rulebased approach altogether and to grant individualized hearings to determine

99. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 943–49 (1987) (discussing role of balancing in contemporary constitutional law).
100. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
101. Id. at 570–72.
102. Id. at 573–74.
103. Id. at 575–76.
104. Id. at 578–79.
105. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 594.
106. Id. at 592.
107. Id. at 592–94.
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the employability of each applicant.108 However, such hearings could be very
expensive and might not be justified in terms of the benefits that they produced.109 Accordingly, the Court held that the Equal Protection clause granted
to the Transit Authority the discretion to strike the cost–benefit balance
between general rules and individualized hearings at whatever point the Transit
Authority deemed appropriate.110 The only constraint imposed on the Transit
Authority’s discretion by the Equal Protection Clause was the requirement that
the Transit Authority’s policy be within the range of reasonableness.111
Justice Powell concurred in the majority’s holding that the Equal
Protection Clause permitted the Transit Authority to ban the employment of
current methadone users. However, he dissented from the majority’s refusal to
consider the constitutional claims of former methadone users. The Transit
Authority applied its narcotic rule to bar even the employment of individuals
who had successfully completed a methadone treatment program, refusing to
consider such individuals for employment until they had been drug-free for at
least five years.112 Because there was no evidence that this five-year delay was
necessary to ensure employability, Justice Powell argued that the Equal
Protection Clause did not permit the Transit Authority to discriminate against
individuals who had been certified as drug-free after completing a methadone
treatment program.113
Justice White dissented, emphasizing that the District Court findings were
based on empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals who had
successfully completed at least one year in a methadone treatment program
were just as employable as members of the general population.114 Moreover,
the Transit Authority did not ban the employment of ex-offenders, former alcoholics, mental patients, diabetics, epileptics, and those currently using
tranquilizers, even though some of those groups were on average less employable than the excluded methadone users.115 Accordingly, Justice White argued
that the Transit Authority rule discriminating against methadone users who had
successfully completed one year of their treatment programs was so arbitrary
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.116

108. Id. at 589.
109. Id. at 590.
110. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 591–92.
111. See id. at 592–93.
112. Id. at 595 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. See id. at 597 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 602–04 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 610–11 (White, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 611 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that ban was unconstitutional as applied to
applicants for low-risk positions who had successfully completed one year of methadone
treatment).
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All of the Justices in Beazer were balancing the competing interests
between fairness to particular job applicants on the one hand and fairness to the
public through a safe and cost-efficient transit system on the other. The thing
that differed among the various opinions in the case was the level of generality
at which the Justices conducted their analyses. The majority opinion of Justice
Stevens was written at the highest level of generality, permitting the exclusion
of all methadone users, regardless of the specific circumstances surrounding
their employability or methadone use.117 Justice Powell’s opinion was written
at an intermediate level of generality, permitting the exclusion from employment of all current methadone users but not of former methadone users
who had completed their treatment programs within the past five years.118 Justice White’s dissent was written at the lowest level of generality, permitting the
exclusion from employment of only those methadone users who were
statistically less likely than the general public to be employable because they
had not yet successfully completed one year of drug treatment.119
The result that each Justice favored was determined by the level of
generality that each Justice adopted. Justice Stevens favored reading the Equal
Protection Clause to grant broad discretion to the Transit Authority because he
viewed the life circumstances of particular applicants to be constitutionally
irrelevant. At the other end of the spectrum, Justice White favored reading the
Equal Protection Clause to grant much more limited discretion to the Transit
Authority because he viewed the life circumstances of particular applicants to
be constitutionally very relevant. The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution was, therefore, determined largely by the level of generality
that each Justice deemed appropriate for the exercise of judicial review.
There is a sense in which the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens
seems correct. The many imponderables entailed in trying to balance the costs
and benefits of narrow employment rules that take account of particular life
circumstances, against the costs and benefits of broad employment rules that
ignore particular life circumstances, makes the task of balancing the competing
interests both difficult and subjective. For example, how much should it
matter that the public might object to the employment of former heroin addicts,
even though the former addicts empirically pose little risk of unemployability?
How much should it matter that applicants may feel as if they have been
treated more fairly under particularized standards than under more mechanical
rules? Should the cost–benefit analysis take account of the fact that the
culture’s drug problems may be exacerbated if recovering former addicts are
unable to secure gainful employment and therefore revert to drug use? Should
it matter if a rule addresses a marginal danger posed by methadone users but
117. See id. at 587–94 (Stevens, J.).
118. See id. at 594–97 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. See id. at 602–11 (White, J., dissenting).
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wholly ignores a more serious danger posed by alcoholics? What if the bulk of
methadone users are members of racial minority groups, while the bulk of
alcoholics are not?120 Is the degree to which an employment rule may have the
effect of aggravating the culture’s racial tensions relevant to the cost–benefit
analysis at issue? Would it be better simply to abandon the use of rules altogether and use more costly adjudicatory hearings to determine
employability? Would such a strategy help the economy by creating more jobs
for lawyers and administrative hearing officials? Or would it harm the
environment by increasing transit fares and discouraging the use of mass
transit? Is a focus on the small danger posed by methadone use justifiable in a
culture that largely ignores the more serious dangers posed by smoking and lax
enforcement of speed limits?121
Intractable questions such as these are difficult to answer with any degree
of confidence. Realizing this, the Beazer majority opinion stands for the
proposition that deferential judicial review should be exercised in typical Equal
Protection cases because the difficult task of striking the proper balance
between the competing interests is a task that should be delegated to the
politically accountable representative branches of government.
In a
democracy, the cost–benefit determinations made by the representative
branches should not be overridden by politically unaccountable judges who
typically have no special expertise.122 Although we may never be able to say
with confidence that we have struck the correct balance between competing
imponderable interests, we should at least be able to say that we have struck
the balance deemed appropriate by our democratically elected representatives.
To do otherwise would risk the creation of a serious counter-majoritarian
problem, where the Supreme Court holds an act of a coordinate branch of
government unconstitutional simply because the Court disagrees with the way
in which that branch of government balanced the competing interests.123
Beazer demonstrates that the level of generality at which a legal argument
is formulated affects the persuasiveness of that argument. But the fact that
legal outcomes are so heavily dependent on the applicable level of generality
also affects the level of deference that is appropriate for judicial review in
constitutional cases. As Beazer suggests, the Supreme Court typically

120. Justice White argued that such a factor may have been what motivated the Transit
Authority’s use of the methadone rule in Beazer. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that methadone rule may have been product of racial animus).
121. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 478–84 (discussing imponderables entailed in Beazer
cost–benefit balancing).
122. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592–94 (applying deferential rational basis review to
governmental classifications that do not entail invidious discrimination against an unpopular
group).
123. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 478–84 (discussing counter-majoritarian difficulties
entailed in non-deferential review of interest balancing conducted by political branches).
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exercises highly deferential, rational basis review in constitutional cases that
do not involve suspect classifications or fundamental rights.124 Because of the
imponderables involved, it is rare for the Court to invalidate the action of a
representative branch under rational basis review. However, there are some
cases in which such invalidations do occur.125
In Lawrence v Texas,126 the Supreme Court applied a rational basis
standard of review but nevertheless held that a Texas statute criminalizing
private homosexual activity unconstitutionally violated the right to liberty
recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.127 In so
holding, the Court overruled its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
had upheld the application of a Georgia criminal sodomy statute to homosexual
activity.128 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence emphasized that
the Bowers Court had erred in asserting that “[t]he issue presented is whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”129 Justice Kennedy instead characterized the issue as
whether the Federal Constitution conferred a fundamental right to liberty that
encompassed the freedom of consenting adults to express the bonds of their
relationship by privately engaging in intimate sexual conduct.130 What Justice
Kennedy did was to shift his analysis to a higher level of generality, rejecting
the decision of the Bowers Court to focus only on homosexual sodomy and
replacing it with a more general focus on a right to intimate sexual privacy that
is possessed by everyone.
Justice Scalia dissented in Lawrence, arguing that any constitutional liberty
or privacy right that might be fundamental enough to warrant invalidating the
Texas statute would have to be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”131 In claiming that
this could not possibly be the case in light of the nation’s long tradition of
opposition to homosexual sodomy, Justice Scalia also shifted the level of
generality. He shifted it from the higher level of general sexual privacy that
had been utilized by the majority back down to the lower level of homosexual
sodomy that had been utilized by the Bowers Court. But Justice Kennedy’s

124. Id. at 474–75, 481–84 (discussing rationale for deferential review in constitutional cases
not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights).
125. Id. at 488–99 (discussing cases in which Supreme Court invalidated governmental action
even under rational basis standard of review).
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. Id. at 578 (apparently applying rational basis standard of review); see also id. at 579–85
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that majority had applied rational basis standard of
review).
128. 478 U.S. 186, 190–96 (1986).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
130. Id. at 566–67.
131. See id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193–94).
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response was to shift to a higher level of generality yet again. In his Lawrence
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that there was not a long national
tradition of opposition to homosexual sodomy, but rather a tradition of opposition to all sodomy, whether homosexual or heterosexual. Because the
trend of enforcing sodomy laws against only homosexuals had begun as
recently as the 1970s—and specific homosexual sodomy had been formally
criminalized in only nine states—such discriminatory enforcement of the
nation’s sodomy laws could hardly be characterized as a longstanding
tradition.132 By manipulating the levels of generality that suited their instrumental objectives, Justices on both sides of the homosexual conduct debate
were able to make their desired outcomes seem as if they flowed naturally
from widely shared views of tradition and sexual privacy.
The Supreme Court exhibited similar manipulations of the level of
generality in its decision concerning the so-called right to die. In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,133 the Court was willing to assume
for the sake of argument that competent individuals possessed a fundamental
right to decline medical treatment—including nutrition and hydration—that
was protected as a liberty interest by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even if declining treatment would result in death.134 The plaintiff
in Cruzan had been injured in an automobile accident and had been in a
persistent vegetative state for a period of seven years, with no evidence of
significant cognitive functions.135 Because the plaintiff had virtually no chance
of recovering her mental facilities, her parents wanted to terminate artificial
nutrition and hydration life-support procedures.136 The question presented in
Cruzan was whether a Missouri statute could constitutionally require a surrogate to show by clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person
would desire the termination of treatment before the State would allow the
termination of nutrition and hydration.
The Court, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the
Due Process Clause did permit Missouri to adopt this clear and convincing
procedural safeguard.137 Rehnquist noted that a balance had to be struck
between the constitutional rights of incompetents to terminate treatment and
the right of a state to ensure the accuracy of treatment termination decisions.138
He concluded that Missouri was constitutionally permitted to adopt a clear and
convincing rule of decision as a means of ensuring such accuracy in order to

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 567–73.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 267.
See id. at 280.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
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advance the state’s important interest in the protection and preservation of
human life.139
Justice Brennan dissented in a way that tacitly shifted the pertinent level of
generality. Although the majority had found that the state had a high interest in
the protection and preservation of human life,140 Brennan argued that the state
actually had no interest whatsoever in protecting the life of a person in a
persistent vegetative state who wanted her treatment terminated.141 The
insistence on continued life-support against the wishes of such a person would
serve no benefit to society or to any third person and would violate the very
constitutional right to terminate treatment whose existence the majority had
assumed.142 Accordingly, the state’s only interest was in ensuring accuracy,
and that interest was better advanced by the normal preponderance standard of
proof that is applied in ordinary civil cases than by a heightened clear and convincing standard of proof that could end up prolonging the plaintiff’s treatment
against the plaintiff’s wishes.143
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan balanced the same
competing interests between the plaintiff and the state. But they were able to
arrive at different conclusions because they compared those competing
interests to each other at different levels of generality. Both the nature of the
plaintiff’s interest in terminating treatment and the state’s interest in protecting
life can be stated at different levels of generality, and the level of generality
can be outcome determinative. Like the technique of baseline shifting, the
technique of manipulating levels of generality can be useful both to expose
hidden weaknesses in a court’s opinions and to hide potential weaknesses in an
advocate’s own arguments to a court.
C. Deconstruction
A third technique that can be useful in uncovering the normative values
and political preferences of judges that may not be apparent on the face of a
judicial opinion is the technique of deconstruction. The term “deconstruction”
is now often used to refer to any process for questioning the soundness of an
argument. My use of the term, however, is intended to be more precise. For
me, deconstruction refers to the process of demonstrating that a logical
argument can be reformulated to generate the opposite of the conclusion that it
was originally offered to support. This process, in turn, reveals that it is the

139. Id. at 280–85.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 312–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the state has no
interest in preserving life of someone in persistent vegetative state who wishes to terminate
treatment).
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normative preferences of the person making the argument—rather than the
syllogistic application of logical rules to legal principles—that are responsible
for the asserted conclusion.
Although the concept of deconstruction was initially associated with
continental philosophy and critical literary theory, Professor Jack Balkin has
described how the inversion of hierarchies can be used to deconstruct legal
arguments.144 Legal rules typically rest on hierarchical oppositions. A rule
treats one state of affairs favorably because that state of affairs advances a
socially desirable goal, and it treats the opposing state of affairs unfavorably
because that state of affairs advances a socially undesirable goal. The process
of deconstruction simply reverses the supposed connection between the
opposing states of affairs and the pertinent goals, thereby inverting the
hierarchy that was initially claimed to exist. Once a rule is deconstructed,
therefore, it points not to the conclusion that it was initially offered to support,
but rather to the opposite conclusion.145
Balkin offers a simple illustration of the process by deconstructing the
constitutional law of standing. The Supreme Court has held that Article III of
the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases in which
the plaintiff suffers some real or threatened injury, as opposed to having a mere
ideological interest in the resolution of a legal issue. The pertinent opposition,
therefore, is the opposition between actual injury and mere ideological interest.
The Article III standing rule establishes a hierarchy between these oppositions
by privileging actual injury and disfavoring mere ideological interest. Injury is
privileged because plaintiffs who suffer an actual injury are likely to be
vigorous advocates in our adversary system and are likely to present the legal
issues in a concrete factual context that is suitable for judicial resolution. Mere
ideological interest is disfavored because ideological plaintiffs are unlikely to
provide the adversary motivation or concrete factual context needed to help the
court reach a proper and narrow resolution of the pertinent issues.146
The Article III law of standing can be deconstructed by inverting the
hierarchies—or stated differently, by reversing the connections between the
two oppositions and their supposed instrumental consequences. Although
conventional Supreme Court wisdom privileges actual injury in order to
promote vigorous advocacy in a concrete adversary context, actual injury is in
fact a bad surrogate for those objectives because it does not ensure the
144. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 743–72
(1987) (discussing deconstruction); see also Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies
Perspective on Contract Law and Practice, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 233–50 (1988)
(illustrating use of inversion of hierarchies technique to deconstruct various contract doctrines).
145. See Balkin, supra note 144, at 746–51 (discussing inversion of hierarchies); see also
Spann, supra note 144, at 231–32 (same).
146. See Balkin, supra note 144, at 754–55 (discussing hierarchy established by Article III
injury requirement for standing).
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requisite motivational zeal. And although the conventional wisdom is that
ideological interest is not likely to advance those objectives, ideological
interest is actually a good surrogate for the Court’s justiciability concerns because ideological commitment to an issue is likely to promote zealous legal
advocacy.147
For example, under the traditional law of standing, a backwoods hermit
having little interest or contact with outside civilization would have standing to
complain about the environmental harm caused by a government construction
project. This would be true even if the particularized adverse impact on the
hermit was very small, and even if the hermit had limited resources and limited
expertise to bring to bear on the environmental litigation. However, a
recognized environmental group would not have standing to complain about
the same injury, even if the environmental group would be a significantly
better litigant in terms of motive, resources and expertise. This would be true
even if the environmental group could provide the court with a much more
highly developed factual context for the litigation, including scientific evidence about the pertinent environmental harms, as well as the costs and
benefits of potential alternatives.148 The ideological interest of a group that
was formed for the express purpose of participating in environmental
protection litigation is, therefore, much more likely to satisfy the Court’s
justiciability concerns than the presence of a technical injury to a random
individual who happens to be a member of a population that is exposed to dirty
air.
Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s constitutional law of standing in this
manner shows that the Court’s own instrumental objectives are better served
by reversing the Court’s hierarchy of privileged and disfavored states of
affairs. Because the standing rule does not advance the interests that are said
to be advanced by that rule, something more subjective must be motivating the
Court’s standing decisions. This suggests that, whatever the Supreme Court’s
standing opinions may say, the law of standing actually rests on unarticulated
normative values and political preferences possessed by the Justices.
The Supreme Court’s current law of racial affirmative action can also be
deconstructed. After more than a decade of flirting with the appropriate
standard of review for benign racial affirmative action programs,149 a majority
of the Court has now settled on strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for
147. See id. (inverting hierarchy established by Article III injury requirement for standing).
148. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–41 (1972) (holding that standing must be
based on actual injury rather than mere ideological interest); see also Girardeau A. Spann,
Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650 n.272 (1983) (discussing the curious fact that the
law of standing would permit an environmental suit by the unsophisticated hermit but not by the
sophisticated environmental group).
149. See SPANN, supra note 14, at 164–68 (discussing Supreme Court’s difficulty in arriving
at standard of review for racial affirmative action that was endorsed by a majority of the Court).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

740

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:709

all racial classifications, whether benign or invidious.150 Unlike the deferential
rational basis review that the Court applied in cases such as New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer151 and Lawrence v. Texas,152 the strict judicial
scrutiny that the Court applies to racial affirmative action is very non-deferential. A racial affirmative action plan can survive strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution only if it is shown to the Court’s
satisfaction that the plan advances a compelling governmental interest and is
narrowly tailored to the advancement of that interest.153 Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative action program for minority student admissions at the University of Michigan Law School in Grutter v. Bollinger,154
finding that both prongs of the strict scrutiny standard were satisfied. On the
same day, however, the Court also invalidated an affirmative action program
for minority student admissions at the University of Michigan undergraduate
college of Literature, Science and the Arts in Gratz v. Bollinger, finding that
the undergraduate program was not narrowly tailored.155
The current Supreme Court’s support of affirmative action is at best
reluctant and ambivalent. The Supreme Court views the racial classifications
used in affirmative action programs as sufficiently suspect to trigger strict
scrutiny because the Court has endorsed a hierarchy under which colorblind
race neutrality is privileged and race consciousness is disfavored.156
Colorblind race neutrality is privileged because it promotes an allocation of
societal resources that is based on merit rather than on the irrelevant
happenstance of race. Race-conscious affirmative action classifications are
disfavored because they distribute benefits and burdens solely on the basis of
race, which is morally illegitimate in a liberal culture that is founded on the
principle of respect for individual identity rather than mere group
membership.157 Stated more succinctly, most race-neutral allocations of

150. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324–26 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to racial
affirmative action); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (same); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 223–37 (1995) (same).
151. 440 U.S. 568, 590–94 (1979) (applying rational basis standard of review); see also supra
notes 100–25 and accompanying text (discussing Beazer).
152. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (apparently applying rational basis standard of review); see id.
at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that majority had applied rational basis standard
of review); see also supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence).
153. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–29.
154. Id. at 322–24, 327–43.
155. 539 U.S. at 247–76.
156. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the personal right of all people to be free from racial
discrimination).
157. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
individuals rather than groups and that group classifications are typically “irrelevant and therefore
prohibited”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (stating that racial classifications are too pernicious to be
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resources are privileged because they advance racial equality, while most raceconscious affirmative action programs are disfavored because they are racially
discriminatory.
Once again, the Supreme Court’s affirmative action hierarchy can be
inverted so that the consequences the Court associates with each pole of the
hierarchy are first detached and then re-attached to the opposite poles. The
Court asserts that race neutrality is good because it advances the culture’s
aspirational goal of achieving a society in which race becomes irrelevant to the
allocation of resources. However, it is really race-conscious affirmative action
that advances this goal. Due to centuries of past racial discrimination—
ranging from the appropriation of Indian lands,158 to slavery,159 to official
segregation,160 to the internment of Japanese-American citizens,161 to de facto
segregation,162—racial minorities have been the victims of the race-conscious
allocation of desirable resources to the white majority. As a result, racial
minorities remain seriously underrepresented in the distribution of societal

tolerated without exacting scrutiny of their justifications); Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 214 (1995) (“The Court observed—correctly—that ‘distinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions
are founded upon the doctrine of equality,’ and that ‘racial discriminations are in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.’” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(maintaining that the government can never have a compelling interest in creating racial
classifications and rejecting concept of racial entitlement as inconsistent with liberal focus on
individuality); id. at 240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial
distinctions are immoral and unconstitutional); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the
driving force of the Equal Protection Clause.”); id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society.” (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
133 (1975)).
158. See Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding
that European discovery of land now constituting United States and conquest of indigenous
Indian inhabitants divested Indians of title to that land).
159. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating congressional
statute prohibiting slavery in Louisiana Territory).
160. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial
segregation).
161. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military
exclusion order that led to internment of Japanese-American citizens).
162. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (adopting
expansive interpretation of de jure segregation but reaffirming prohibition on use of raceconscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (same); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976)
(reading the Equal Protection Clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by
intentional discrimination).
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benefits and seriously overrepresented in the distribution of societal burdens.163
By privileging prospective race neutrality in the allocation of resources, the
Court is both freezing and perpetuating those existing inequalities. Therefore,
a preference for colorblind race neutrality actually ends up constituting a
preference for continued racial discrimination because it requires racial
minorities to be better and to work harder than the white majority simply to
catch up and keep pace with whites.
The Court also asserts that race-conscious affirmative action is bad
because it forces us to think in terms of racial categories, which ignore the
concept of individual identity that is essential to the foundations of our liberal
culture. In so doing, we unfairly and stereotypically treat people as if their
identities were determined merely by the racial groups in which they are
members, rather than by their own particular attributes and abilities. However,
it is really colorblind race neutrality that forces us to ignore individual identity
and to think stereotypically in terms of racial categories. Because the white
majority has the economic, political, and social power to define the norms that
will prevail in United States culture, cultural norms end up being white norms.
Racial minorities, therefore, tend to be judged not on their own merits but
rather on the degree to which they do or do not live up to the white norms that
govern appropriate appearance, attitudes, and behavior. Affirmative action
seeks to counteract this tendency by ensuring that at least a small percentage of
society’s resources are distributed to racial minorities on the basis of their
individual merit, rather than on the basis of their compliance with white
cultural norms. It is affirmative action that advances the liberal ideal of
individual identity by relaxing the hold that white culture has over racial
minority identity.164
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action hierarchy is backward. It is affirmative action that is good, because affirmative action promotes racial
equality in the allocation of resources and advances our interests in liberal
individuality and merit. And it is colorblind race neutrality that is bad, because
colorblind race neutrality perpetuates our existing forms of racial discrimination and overrides our concern for individuality by insisting that everyone in
our increasingly diverse culture comply with the norms of the prevailing white
culture. Once again, it appears that the Supreme Court’s normative values and
political preferences—rather than the “law” of Equal Protection—are what
have generated the Supreme Court’s doctrinal views about affirmative action.
163. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating existing
racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
299–303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. For more elaborate critiques that I have offered of the Supreme Court’s law of
affirmative action, see Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J.
1 (1995); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004);
Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2004).
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It probably comes as no surprise to anyone that political preferences influence the arguments that Supreme Court Justices make with respect to
controversial issues such as affirmative action. However, the process of
deconstruction can also be used to reverse implicit hierarchies where the
normative values and political preferences of the Justices are less apparent.
Consider once again the case of Lochner v. New York,165 where the Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute prescribing maximum hours for the employment of bakers on the grounds that the statute interfered with the freedom
of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendement’s Due Process Clause.166
As has been discussed,167 that decision rested on the baseline assumption that a
“natural” economic market was being distorted by the maximum-hours subsidy
that the statute granted to workers. Shifting the analytical baseline, however,
revealed that the maximum-hours legislation did not distort the market in favor
of workers any more than the law’s underlying enforcement of private
contracts distorted the market in favor of employers.168
One possible response to this baseline shifting maneuver in Lochner is to
distinguish the maximum-hours subsidy for workers from the contractenforcement subsidy for employers. Unlike the market-distorting subsidies
granted to workers in the form of maximum-hours legislation, state
enforcement of private agreements through the regime of contract law is not
really a market subsidy at all. Rather, public enforcement of contracts is
designed to structure the economic market instead of providing a subsidy to
particular players in that market. This attempted distinction rests on a
hierarchy between market structuring and market subsidies. Government
intervention designed to structure the market is privileged because properly
functioning markets can be relied upon to facilitate the efficient allocation of
goods and services in society by ensuring that goods and services go to those
who value them most highly.169 Government intervention designed to
subsidize particular players in the market is disfavored because those subsidies
distort market functioning in a way that undermines the efficient allocation of
goods and services by permitting some goods and services to go to those who
value them less highly than others.170
This distinction between market-structuring contract law and marketdistorting subsidies can be deconstructed by inverting the supposed hierarchy
165. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
166. See id. at 64–65.
167. See supra notes 59–78 and accompanying text (discussing Lochner).
168. See id.
169. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13 (1998) (defining
efficiency as “allocation of resources in which value is maximized”); id. § 3.1, at 36–39 (noting
that efficiency is increased through transferability of rights in economic markets).
170. See id. § 1.2, at 16 (discussing potential inefficiency of forced exchanges as opposed to
market exchanges); id. § 8.2, at 276 (discussing economic effect of subsidies).
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on which it rests. The initial hierarchy asserts that contract law is good
because, by providing for the enforcement of private agreements, it structures
the market in a way that promotes the efficient allocation of resources through
market ordering. People who value goods and services more highly than
others will feel secure in paying more than their competitors for those goods
and services because the rules of contract law will protect their investments by
enforcing their purchase agreements.171 However, government enforcement of
private agreements through the operation of contract law is actually bad
because it ends up undermining efficient market ordering. That is because
contract law will not enforce all private agreements, but rather will enforce
only those private agreements of which contract law approves. It will not
enforce a contract to purchase heroin or a contract to murder someone, no
matter how highly the parties value those goods and services.172 More mundanely, contract law will not enforce even the remedies for breach to which the
parties themselves agree unless the rules of contract law approve of those
remedies. Although the parties may agree that specific performance or penalty
provisions will provide the appropriate level of incentive to ensure the
performance of their mutual obligations, the law will award specific
performance in only narrowly circumscribed circumstances173 and will not
enforce penalty provisions for mere breach of contract at all.174 This selective
enforcement of contract provisions distorts market ordering by depriving the
parties of the ability to express the intensity of their preference through their
willingness to pay. As a result, goods and services will not necessarily go to
the users who value them most highly, but rather will go to those whom the
many filtering rules of contract law deem most deserving.175 No matter how
much I want Reading pipe for the plumbing in my new house, contract law will
not enforce my efforts to get Reading pipe if the law views the incentives I
have chosen as excessive—even if I am willing to pay extra consideration to
my contracting partner for those incentives as a means of expressing the
intensity of my preference.176 Contract law’s variable enforcement of private
171. See id. § 4.1, at 101–08 (discussing economic function served by contract law enforcement of private agreements).
172. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (3d ed. 2004)
(discussing contract law restrictions on enforcement of illegal contracts).
173. See 3 id. §§ 12.4–12.8, at 161–203 (discussing contract law limitations on specific performance).
174. See 3 id. § 12.18, at 300 (discussing contract law refusal to enforce penalty provisions).
175. See generally 1 id. at xi–xix (Table of Contents listing plethora of contract rules that
restrict enforcement of contracts).
176. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (refusing to award specific
performance or substantial damages for breach of construction contract calling for use of Reading
pipe); see also JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 833–34 (8th ed.
2003) (quoting explicit contract language requiring replacement of all non-conforming
construction, which the court refused to enforce).
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agreements, therefore, does not structure the market, but rather distorts the
market by selectively subsidizing only those agreements that the law of contracts deems desirable.
The initial hierarchy also asserts that maximum-hours legislation is bad
because by subsidizing one side in employer–employee labor contract
negotiations, such legislation distorts market ordering through the inefficient
provision of employment benefits to the subsidized employees. Because those
employees did not value the benefits highly enough to make the economic
concessions necessary to secure them in contract negotiations with their
employers, those benefits end up being extracted from the employers who
value them more highly than they are valued by the employees—even though
the employers would have been able to retain those benefits in the absence of
the market-distorting subsidy to the employees.177 However, the statutory
maximum-hours subsidy is actually good because it ends up correcting for a
serious market defect in a way that is necessary to permit the market to allocate
goods and services in an efficient manner. In order for economic markets to
operate efficiently, by allocating goods and services to those who value them
most highly, some reliable scale has to be used to measure the intensity of
competing preferences for goods and service.
Economics is premised on the belief that the willingness to pay money is a
reliable measure of the intensity of one’s preferences.178 However, the
marginal utility of money declines as one’s wealth increases, so that a dollar is
worth more to someone who is poor than it is to someone who is rich. This
“wealth effect” distorts the operation of economic markets by undermining the
reliability of willingness to pay as a measure of preference intensity.179
Employers typically have considerably more wealth than employees, thereby
permitting employers to extract inefficient bargaining concessions from
employees during contract negotiations. That is because resources having
economic value often end up being retained by employers, even though
employees value them more highly, simply because employees lack the money
necessary to express the intensity of their preferences. The one-sided subsidy
that maximum-hours legislation gives to employees in labor contract negotiations with their employers, therefore, becomes an economic palliative for
this wealth-effect market distortion. It not only helps employees accurately
express the intensity of their preferences in the labor market, but more
significantly, it helps the market itself allocate goods and services to the users
who genuinely value them most highly.

177. See POSNER, supra note 169, § 1.2, at 16 (discussing the potential inefficiency of forced
exchanges, as opposed to market exchanges); id. § 8.2 at 276 (discussing the economic effect of
subsidies).
178. See id. § 1.2, at 12 (defining value as willingness to pay).
179. See id. (describing wealth effects).
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The initial economic hierarchy in Lochner is backward. The maximumhours subsidy to workers is good, rather than bad, because it is that subsidy
that permits economic markets to work efficiently in the allocation of goods
and services to those who value them most highly by correcting for marketdistorting wealth effects. And the market-structuring rules of contract law are
bad, rather than good, because it is those rules that distort efficient market
ordering by selectively enforcing only those market preferences of which
contract law itself approves, thereby undermining the ability of the market to
direct goods and services to the users who value them most highly. Even when
legal doctrine is paired with other disciplines, such as economics, it is still the
normative values and political preferences of judges that ultimately end up
determining the outcome of constitutional cases.
The fact that constitutional arguments can be deconstructed by inverting
the hierarchies on which those arguments rest does not mean that those
constitutional arguments are wrong. It is important to remember that a
deconstructed argument can always be deconstructed yet again, to re-establish
the original hierarchy. For example, the market-structuring rules of contract
law in Lochner can once again be made good, rather than bad, by emphasizing
that the selective enforcement inclinations of contract law are actually efficient. Contract rules reflect centuries of experience with the types of
preferences that individuals tend to have over the range of cases, thereby saving the administrative costs that would otherwise have to be incurred if we
were to make efficiency determinations from scratch in each individual case.180
And the maximum-hours subsidy to employees can again be made bad, rather
than good, by emphasizing that haphazard efforts to correct for wealth effects
are as likely to exacerbate as to correct for market distortions. Therefore, the
most sensible way to make efficiency determinations is simply to assume the
adequacy of the existing distribution of resources and to focus our attention on
the prospective efficiency of market transactions.181 There is no stopping point
in the deconstruction process, short of the constraints imposed by limitations
on our own analytical creativity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The meaning of the post-realist Constitution is ultimately determined by
the normative values and political preferences of a majority of the Justices on
the Supreme Court. Those normative values and political preferences are
constitutionalized through Supreme Court opinions that purport to demonstrate
how the Court’s outcomes flow logically from the language, structure, and
180. See id. § 4.1, at 104–06 (discussing efficiency-enhancing function of contract default
rules).
181. See id. § 1.2, at 15 (discussing economic focus on efficiency rather than distributional
consequences).
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original intent of the Constitution. But the analytical techniques that the Court
uses to make such demonstrations can also be brought to bear on the Court’s
own arguments in a way that exposes the analytically vulnerable points in the
Court’s opinions. By shifting the baselines implicit in court’s analyses, by
manipulating the level of generality assumed in the Court’s opinions, and by
deconstructing the Court’s instrumental arguments through the inversion of the
hierarchies that the Court adopts, students of constitutional law can illuminate
the manner in which the normative values and political preferences of the
Court play a dispositive role in generating the Court’s constitutional outcomes.
These same techniques can also be used by practitioners and commentators to
formulate arguments explaining why the Court should constitutionalize the
normative values and political preferences that those practitioners and commentators believe to be appropriate. Mastering such techniques is the essence
of learning how to do constitutional law.
A jurisprudentially more interesting question concerns what effect this
view of the Constitution as a repository for privileged normative values and
political preferences ought to have on the culture’s continued commitment to
the institution of judicial review. If the Constitution has only the content that
the Supreme Court chooses to give it, why should the culture persist in
believing that the institution of judicial review is an acceptable mode of public
policy-making in a society that is committed to the principle of democratic
self-governance? Why should the normative values and political preferences
of the politically unaccountable Supreme Court ever take precedence over the
normative values and political preferences of the people, as expressed through
the actions of the representative branches of government? In a post-realist
legal culture, the counter-majoritarian problem inherent in the exercise of
judicial review looms as a potentially insoluble problem. If there are good
reasons for the culture’s continued adherence to the institution of post-realist
judicial review, it makes sense to try to ascertain and articulate what those
reasons might be. If there are no good reasons—or if the reasons are actually
bad reasons that relate to the preservation of an often unjust and oppressive
status quo—perhaps it is time to promote judicial review to the status of an intriguing artifact of the nation’s pre-realist history. I suspect that the most
important thing there is to teach about constitutional law is the need to
formulate a considered position on the propriety of judicial review, rather than
simply abstaining, as the bulk of contemporary culture seems so content to do.
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